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PRESIDENT'S NOTES 
Resistance to the tyranny of King 
George lll took many forms in the 
beleaguered American colonies in 
November 1775. One of the more 
inrriguing accounrs, which I came across 
recently, concerned the individual act of 
defiance of a good citizen of Newport by 
the name of Coggeshall. As reported in 
the Newport Mercury of 6 November 
1775: 
Earl.y lase Saturday morning 
(November 4) one Coggeshall, 
being somewhat drunk or crazy, 
went on the Long-Wharf, and 
rurn'd up his backsides coward the 
bomb brig in rhis harbour, using 
some insulting words; upon which 
the brig fired two 4 pound shot at 
him; one of which went through 
the roof of Mr. Hammond's store 
on the said wharf, and lodged in 
Mr. Samuel Johnston's distillery, at 
the N.E. part of the cove, within 
the Long Wharf. The man was 
soon after taken up, and sent our of 
town. 
The British retaliation to this 
singular (if unusual) act of patriotism 
could hardly be termed a measured 
response; indeed ir might even be 
termed overkill. Certainly, hitting the 
Newporrers' source of liquid refresh­
ment might have evoked an unwanted 
response by fanning faster the flames of 
rebellion. 
......... 
Fortunately for rhe future of the 
United States-and wirhour impugning 
citizen Coggeshall's show of independ­
ence-an event of much greater and 
lasring moment took place in Philadel­
phia char very week of 1775. 
The Continental Congress, on LO 
November 1775, ordered the creation of 
two battalions of Marines, thereby 
establishing the United States Marine 
Corps. One of rhe mandates of the 
Continental Congress in this resolution 
was char " ... particular care be taken, 
rhat no persons be appointed ro office, 
or inlisred [sic] inro said battalions, bur 
such are good seamen, or so acquainted 
with maritime affairs so as to be able co 
serve co advantage by sea when 
required .... " 
The Marine Corps has served with 
disrincrion in maritime affairs since its 
birth in 1775. Here at the Naval War 
C ollege ,  M ar ine  of ficers are an  
important part o f  our faculty and 
student body. Ar present, 26 are 
enrolled in the College of  Naval 
Warfare, 20 are in the College of Naval 
Command and Staff and 10 serve in key 
positions on the faculty. 
Mar ines  were  present at  the  
beginnings of  the Naval War College 
and have played an important role in its 
evolutionary development as the 
highest professional-level educational 
institution in the Navy. The first 4
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4 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW 
NATO's 30-yea-r exirtence has given it almost the character of a familiar statue­
we seldom ask how it came to he. Thi; paper looks at the founding of NATO, the 
treaty, the organizational structure, and the military forces-what conditions 
reqnired and fostered NATO and why what resulted, rather than something ehe, did 
result. It also invites a consUeration of two not opposite questions-whether the 
defense of Europe ,hould be more "Europeanized"; whether NATO should be 
geographically and fnnctionally broadened. 
THE CREATION OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC ALLIANCE, 
1948-1952 
by 
Alan K. Henrikson 
And the earth was withouc form, 
and void; and darkness was upon 
the face of the deep. And the Spirit 
of God moved upon the face of the 
waters. Genesis 1:2. 
On 4 April 1949, at a ceremony in the 
ornate Departmental Auditorium in 
Washington, D.C., the North Atlantic 
Treaty was signed. For all of rhe 12 
parties, European no less than North 
American, rhe pact-a peacetime 
military coalition transoceanic in 
scope-was unprecedented. Not since 
the breakup in 1822 of the Quadruple 
Alliance against a Bonapartist resur­
gence in France had Europe known such 
a strong grouping of Great Powers in 
peace. In 1947 th e United States had 
signed the Treaty of Rio de Janeiro to 
protect the Western Hemisphere, bur it 
had not been formally linked with any 
European power since irs 1778 
Revolutionary War alliance with France 
dissolved by murnal agreement in 1800, 
Probably more than any other 
international arrangement in history, 
even the League of Nations and rhe 
United Nations, the North Atlantic 
AIHance has set-not to say in a deeper 
sense caused-the pattern of interna­
tional relations that we in the Atlantic 
world today tend to take for granted. It 
has been regarded-rightly-as a major 
core of international stability. "To 
protect this area against war,'' declared 
President Truman at the signing 
ceremony, "will be a long step toward 
permanent peace in the whole world." 1 
Nonerheless, there is a growing 
apprehension that the Atlantic 
AlJiance, confined as it is in member­
ship, geography, and function, may be 
This arricle is based on a paper delivered orally at The Newport lnstirute Conference-"Is There a Need 
For an Alternadve to NATO?''-on 10 November 1979. The autho.wishes tu thank the partkipants in 
that meeting .u well as othec persons who havecommemed on the basic text. Besides several colleagues at 
The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomaty, these .include Theodore C. Achilles, James M. Gavin, Lord 
Gladwyn, Andrew J. Goodpaster, Ernest A. Gross, AlfredM.Gruenther,John D. Hickerson, Lord Inchyra, 
George R Kennan, Lyman L. Lemnirzer, Robert A. Lovctr, and Francis 0. Wikox. For any remaining 
errors of historical fa<:t or intcrprerarion, of course, the author alone is responsible. 7
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40 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW 
Glavnoe komandovanie, the Soviet equivalent of the Western concept of theater 
commandj was usually used in World lV' ar If in those critical operatloni requiring 
coordination and direction of two or more fronts and involving the several JerviceJ, 
Soviet military literature is evincing increased interest in the concept and there have 
been hints that such a command has already been established in the Far East. 
GLAVNOE KOMANDOVANIE: 
THE SOVIET THEATER COMMAND 
by 
Gregory C. Baird 
Introduction, The command and 
control of a Soviet front, the highest 
strategic ground formation, is typically 
understood as a direct Moscow-to-front 
scheme, devoid of intermediary 
command entities, In fact, the command 
and control of Soviet fronts throughout 
World War II included a numberof such 
intermediaries. Of these, one equates to 
our conception of a theater command. 
The theater of military operations 
(Teatr eoennykh deystvij or TVD) had 
become accepted by many Western 
analysts as the Soviet equivalent of a 
theater command. 1 However, the TVD 
is, simply, "that place where military 
operations will be carried out." 2 It 
roughly equates to the Euro pean 
military-geographic term, theater of 
operations, The actual Sovjet equivalenr 
to a theater command is the Glavnoe 
lwmandovanie or high command. This 
article will briefly describe the high 
command, the Soviet use of this 
command echelon during World War II, 
and its modern applicability as 
evidenced in Soviet Hterature.' 
The High Commands of 1941-1942. 
The formation of the high command 
echelon was a direct result of the failure 
of Soviet prewar defense plans 
following the German attack on 22June 
194 I. The Soviets had envisioned a 
forward defense of their European 
border by three fronts-the North­
western, Western and Southwestern­
each charged with the defense of a 
strategic sector (Le., the approaches to 
Leningrad, Minsk and Kiev). The from, 
as it had been in both WW I and the 
Civil War, was virtually a theater 
command in this scheme. Consequently, 
the necessity for multifront coordinMed 
operations had not been envisioned 
prior m the war. 
Overall strategic direction of these 
fronts was the responsibility of the 
Central M ilirary Council headed by the 
CommJssar for Defense. Centralized 43
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War Plan ORA Neil! assumed tht1t America alone would /ace Japan in,, Pacific war 
tl/tvr Germany had heen defeated, th,it there would be no threat in the Atlantic and 
Caribbean are,ir. As 1,,te a.r October 1940 it remained the only we/I-developed plan­
even after h'ttrope was overrun and l!'ng/,md wa.r bracing for invusion. Little wonder 
that critfr.r of that time and .rince have Jm,lh:d the plan and the Navy's 1mmovin1< 
support of 1/, Another view crm be taken, however;" wider view that considen naval 
officers' ana/yJis of .rtraleRJ and diplomatic qtte.rtions regardini!, the pre-1941 Pacific. 
THE U.S. NAVY 
AND WAR PLAN ORANGE, 1933-1940: 
MAKING NECESSITY A VIRTUE 
by 
Michael K. Doyle 
In October 1940 Capt. A.W. Clarke, 
R,N,, the British Government's 
personal liaison with President 
Franklin Roosevelt, received an 
inviration ro visit the Navy 
Department's War Plans Division. 
Once there, Clarke's host, Capt. 
Richmond "Kelley" Turner, ushered 
him into a room, unlocked a safe, and 
presented him with a document that 
proved co be the U.S. Navy's 
operational plans for war with Japan 
Left atone and encouraged to read, the 
British captain was astonished at the 
amount of derail the plans contained. 
What he was seeing was the 
culmination of almost two decades of 
efforts by U.S. Navy strategists to 
prepare for a conflict they had believed 
almost unavoidable since the end of 
World W,ir One. 1 
What is remarkable is that the Navy's 
Bask War Plan ORANGE, the 
drn.:umem Clarke perused. was little 
more than a literary artifact in October 
1910.' Events in Europe had radically 
trnnsformcd the conditions under 
which any Pad fie war would be fought. 
Hitler's armies had overrun the Low 
Countries and Frnnce, the German air 
force was systematically devastating 
English cities, and conceivably the 
Brirish Isles would face invasion in the 
near forure, The growing danger ro the 
security of the Atfantic and Caribbean 
had already been publicly expressed, 
first in the Ace of Havana in July and 
followed by the descroyers-for�bases 
deal with Britain in September 19,JO} 
Yet the fleet remained at Pearl Harhor, 
symbol of traditional American 
preo(cuparion with the Pacific. 52
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Terrorism, a term in common use, has little common meaning amonf!, its user!. 
Individual experience, background, prejudice, and intention may flavor any attempt 
at definition but efforts toward increased clarity should continue. This article is such 
an endeavor. 
TERRORISM IS '! • • • •  
by 
Major William R. Farrell, U.S. Air Force 
When one speaks of terrorism it is 
nor always dear just what one has in 
mind. The term has no precise and 
completely accepted definition. Some 
countries label those who engage in 
violenc acts against chem as ''terrorists.·• 
Freedom fighters rarely label them• 
selves in such a way, but they often claim 
they are subjccred to governmental 
terror. "In short, the definition of 
terrorism seems to depend on point of 
view-it is what the 'bad guys' do.'' 1 
Terrorism is frequently described as 
mindless, senseless and irrational 
vjolence. However, none of these terms 
is appropriate. It is not mindless and 
there is a theory of terrorism that 
frequently works. Terrorism should be 
viewed as a means to an end and not an 
end unto itself. While terrorist activity 
may appear random, closer examination 
reveals that terrorism has objectives. 
Attacks a re often carefully choreo­
g raphed to att ract news media 
attention. Hostages serve to increase 
the drama, especially if their being 
killed is a possibility. Terrorism is 
aimed at the people watching and, in 
this sense, "terrorism is rheater."2 
While the term "terrorism" is often 
indiscriminately used and is difficult to 
use acrurately in a strictly legal context, 
it raises little doubt in the mind of the 
man in the screer. Though definitional 
p recision is difficult, terrodsm is not 
hard to describe and, for those who have 
experienced it, is easy to comprehend, 
"Terrorism is thus an easily recognized 
activity of a bad character, subjectively 
determined and shaped by social and 
political considerations." 3 The term is 
in flux-like fashion, it is anything we 
choose it to be. When the question 
"What is terrorism?" is raised, there 
always is present some sort of an 
answer, though it is often colored by rhe 
purposes of asking it.4 
From a "purely physical" perspective, 
terrorism is n ot easily isolable from 
wars, disasters, and the like. And, when 
combin ed with the known subjectivity 
of those who seek to attach a definition 
to it1 grea tly complicates any attempt to 
count and me asure terrorist trends.� 
Early attempts to isolate and deal with 
terrorism ( 1890s) produced a number of 
theories. Cranial measures of captured 
terrorists were taken and a connection 
between terrorism and lunar phases was 
detected. Cesare Lombroso, a distin­
guished criminologist of his day, found 
bo th med ical and climatological 
explanations. "Terrorism, like pellagra 
and some other diseases. was caused by 
certain vitamin deficiencies, hence its 
prevalence among maize-eating people 
67
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In early 1941 the United States and Great Britain agreed that strategic 
reJpomibi/ity for the Weftern Atlantic would reJt with the United States when that 
nation entered the war, The United States did asrume such respomibi/ity. It is little 
remembered, however, that ihe U.S. N(wy contributed only two percent of the eJCort 
forces to the sub.requent Battle of the Atlantic while Canada contributed 48 percent. 
With this force disparity and with the U.S. Navy's relative inexperience in 
antisubmarine warf,,re (and the charge of its unwillingnesr to learn), little wonder 
that Canada was dissatisfied and sought to regain control of her own seapower. She 
fin;;lly rucceeded and the revised relationrhips that were then ertablirhed are 
reflected in those of today. 
THE ROY AL CANADIAN NAVY'S QUEST 
FOR AUTONOMY IN 
THE NORTH WEST ATLANTIC: 1941-43 
by 
Commander W.G.D. Lund, Canadian Forces 
On 30 April !943 the Royal Canadian 
Navy assumed responsibility for the 
protection and control of shipping in 
the North West AtJanrk. This evem 
marked the successful conclusion of a 
campaign by the Royal Canadian Navy 
to gain control of its rapidly expanding 
seapower and to assen autonomy in an 
ocean area that was of primary national 
interest. 
In 194 I the Mackenzie King 
government had stated that it was 
" , , , not prepared to place the strategical 
direction of the Royal Canadian Navy 
[in the Western Arlantic] unreservedly 
under rhe will of rhe United States," 1 
However, when Grear Britain signed 
che Americun�British Conversations-1 
(ABC. I) Agreement with the United 
Srates on behalf of rhe British 
Commonwealth, the Royal Canadian 
Navy was relegated w the position of a 
subcommand of the U.S. Navy. 
Beginnings. On 14 September 1939, 
after war had been declared, an Order• 
in�Council was issued that directed 
Canada's six destroyers "to cooperate to 
the fullest extent with the forces of the 
Royal Navy." 2 These six ships, in 
addition to five minesweepers, were 
the Roya! Canadian Navy and the 
intent of the order was to avoid placing 
Canada's small navy completely under 
the control of the British Admiralty. 
This reflected Mackenzie King's prewar 
policy of maintaining the grearesr 
measure of autonomy possib!e in 
defense arrangements with Great 
Britain. 
A change that affected command 
relationships occurred in early ! 940 
when the Naval Council received 
approval from the Cabinet War 
Commir:ree to place all the Canadian 
destroyers under rhe operational 
control, in fact ar rhe disposal, of the 76
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SET AND DRIFT 
ENERGY: BACK TO BASICS 
by 
Richmond M. Lloyd* 
Introduction. The American people 
first felt the effects of tbe energy crisis 
in 1973 when OPEC curtailed oil 
shipments ro the United Scates and 
raised rhe price of a barrel of oil from 
S2.59 ro SI I.65. Federal price controls 
and allocation schemes were pm into 
operation as a temporary measure, and 
President Ford called on the nation to 
embark on Project Independence, 
ln 1979, oil shipments were cm 
again, this rime as a result of the 
political upheaval in Iran. Long gas 
lines and odd/even rationing 
reappeared. Federal comrols were still 
in place. Presidem Carter once a,t;rtin 
called on the nation to move toward 
independence. 
The total petroleum product 
supplied to the United States in 1973 
was I 7.3 million barrels per day of 
which 6.3 million barrels per day were 
imported. During 1974 and 1975, 
imports fell slighrly such that U.S. 
dependence on imported perro1eum 
held ar abour 37 percent. However, by 
1976 imports were again on the rise, In 
l978 they reached 8,2 million b,urels 
per day or 44 percent of the daily supply 
of 18.8 million barrels. 1 
The 7-year long debate over a 
national energy policy has appeared 
•Professor of Management, Naval War College.
confused and even chaotic ar rimes. 
There have been the perennial hunts 
for scapegoats, an illusive search for 
quick solutions, and cries for massive 
government inrervemion and crash 
prograff1s reffiinisrent of the 1960s, 
Even the very existence of an energy 
crisis has been questioned. FinaJly, 
rhroughout, there has been an overall 
sense of national frustration. 
ft i!, t imc that the nation turn back to 
basics. There are four major factors that 





A fundamental shift in the balance 
among these four factors is required in 
order to establish a comprehensive 
energy policy. This shift is occurring, 
though very slowly. It affects the 
essence of American values and 
institurions and that partly explains 
why rhe de bare has been so long and 
rorruous. Each of rhe four facmrs will be 
considered in turn. 
National Security. The energy 
shortage is a major threat to the 
national sernrity of rhe Unired Sratcs 
and its allies, and yet) its effect on 
narional security policy and military 
forces is just beginning to be felr, This is 96
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